RELEASE IN FULL

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
~~DECL: 3/23/2039~~

Previously Approved Policies to Scrutinize and Generally Deny Visas

~~(C)~~ There is ample precedent for policies to scrutinize and generally deny visas to classes of persons under the Secretary's foreign policy authority. For example, visa denial policies for the following classes of persons have been adopted pursuant to the Secretary's authority to deny visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 212(a)(3)(C):

~~(C)~~ **Russia/Ukraine (March 2014):** Current and former Russian and Ukrainian government officials and other persons responsible for, or complicit in, or responsible for ordering or otherwise directing actions that threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, including Russian troop movements and unauthorized actions by the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and other regional Ukrainian regional authorities.

~~(C)~~ **Ukraine (February 2014):** Ukrainian officials and other individuals responsible for, or complicit in, or responsible for ordering or otherwise directing, or for participating in human rights abuses related to political oppression in Ukraine.

~~(S)~~ **Syria (December 2013):** All Syrian government officials and the immediate family members of such officials (updating July 2013 Syria policy to deny visas to Syrian officials "responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses").

~~(C)~~ **Rwanda (May 2012):** Current and former military officials indicted in 2008 by a Spanish court for war crimes and related offenses.

~~(C)~~ **Mali (April 2012):** Persons, and the immediate family members of such persons, who promote the efforts of Captain Amadou Sanogo and the Committee for the Re-Establishment of Democracy and Restoration of the State to seize control of Mali, or otherwise undermine Mali's return to civilian rule and a democratically elected government.

~~(C)~~ **Libya (February 2011):** All senior officials of the Libyan government responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, or otherwise directing, or participating in the commission of human rights abuses related to political repression in Libya.

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~~Classified by: WHA Assistant Secretary Roberta S. Jacobson~~
~~E.O. 13526, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)~~

~~(C)~~ **Iran (December 2010):** Iranian government officials and other persons acting on behalf of the government who are responsible for the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of such persons.

~~(C)~~ **Cote d'Ivoire (December 2010):** Persons and family members of such persons who promote Laurent Gbagbo's efforts to seize the presidency of Cote d'Ivoire or otherwise block Cote d'Ivoire's progress toward democracy, rule of law, and reconciliation.

~~(C)~~ **Madagascar (September 2010):** Persons who promoted Andry Rajoelina's undemocratic seizure of power and otherwise block the return of democracy in Madagascar.

~~(C)~~ **Niger (October 2009):** Persons who promote President Tandja's undemocratic seizure of power or otherwise block Niger's return to democracy and rule of law.

~~(C)~~ **Guinea (October 2009):** Persons who obstruct progress toward democracy and the rule of law by supporting Dadis Camara's military junta.

~~(C)~~ **Honduras (August 2009):** Persons who willfully participated in the coup against the democratically elected government and/or the subsequent establishment and support of an illegitimate interim government in Honduras.

~~(C)~~ **Mauritania (October 2008):** Persons who obstruct the release and re-instatement of President Abdallahi and/or otherwise impede the return to constitutional rule in Mauritania.

~~(S/NF)~~ **Fiji (December 2006):** Persons who actively participated in the military coup against the democratically elected government of Fiji, or the subsequent establishment of an illegitimate interim government. No formal foreign policy determinations have been made pursuant to this policy.

~~(S/NF)~~ **Syria (September 2005):** High level Syrian officials and their immediate family members, to increase pressure on Damascus to comply with its international obligations, including to expel leaders of Palestinian rejectionist groups, stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, cease interference in Lebanese domestic affairs,

and end support for terrorist groups such as Hizbollah. No formal foreign policy determinations have been made pursuant to this policy.

~~(C)~~ **Cuba (March 2004):** Persons who participated on behalf of the Cuban government in its summary trials of 75 dissidents arrested March 2003, and their immediate family members, in order to hold those persons accountable and discourage others from taking part in such trials in the future. No formal foreign policy determinations have been made pursuant to this policy.

~~(C)~~ **Indonesia and Timor-Leste (August 2003):** Persons indicted by the UN Serious Crimes Unit (Timor-Leste) and Ad Hoc Tribunal (Indonesia) for human rights abuses committed in Timor-Leste in 1999 and their immediate family members, to reinforce our statements regarding the inadequacy of the tribunal process and our credibility on related human rights issues. No formal foreign policy determinations have been made pursuant to this policy.

~~(SBU)~~ **Moldova (February 2003, with the EU):** Top leaders of the illegitimate and internationally unrecognized regime in Moldova's breakaway region of Transnistria, to counter their obstruction of political settlement negotiations in Moldova and of Russian military withdrawal from Moldova as mandated by the 1999 Istanbul summit. No formal foreign policy determinations have been made pursuant to this policy.

Belarus (July 1998-December 2004, all in concert with the EU):

- ~~(C)~~ Senior Belarusian officials, to respond to the eviction of the U.S. ambassador from his residence in violation of international law. Two formal foreign policy determinations were made pursuant to this policy, which was in effect from July 1998 until September 1999.

- ~~(SBU)~~ Senior Belarusian officials, in response to the government's obstruction of the OSCE Assistance Monitoring group in Minsk. No formal foreign policy determinations have been made pursuant to this policy, which was in effect from November 2002 until April 2003.

- ~~(SBU)~~ Senior Belarusian officials implicated in politically motivated disappearances. No formal foreign policy determinations have been made pursuant to this policy, which was approved September 2004.

- ~~(SBU)~~ Belarusian officials responsible for election fraud or other efforts to subvert the democratic process or to violate internationally recognized human rights in Belarus. No formal foreign policy determinations have been made pursuant to this policy, which was approved December 2004.